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Theeducation industry has two characteristics which make it a prime
candidate for a study of efficiency: size and rising costs. Education
represents one of the largest industries in the nation with estimated total
direct expenditures of about $108 billion in 1974—75, representing about
eight per cent of the gross national product (Bell 1974). During the same
period, estimated employment was over 3 million for student enroll-
ments of about 59 million. Beyond its sheer magnitude, the education
industry has experienced very steep increases in costs. For example,
between 1961—62 and 1971—72 the current expenditure per pupil in real
terms (1971—72 dollars) rose from $569 to $934 at the elementary-
secondary level and from $1,676 to $2,367 at the college level (U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1972: 3). These represent
increases in real costs over the decade of about 64 per cent and 41 per
cent respectively.
• Of course, one possible explanation for rising costs might be qualita-
tive increases in educational output. Yet, there seems to be no evidence
of such a trend. Rather there appears to be increasing concern with the
quality of schools as reflected in public opinion surveys (Gallup 1970),
educational critiques (Silberman 1970; Greer 1972; Carnoy 1972), and
149voter support. For example, in 1962 voters approved about 80 per cent
of school bond issues, while in 1969 the proportion of approvals had
declined to only 44 per cent (Gallup 1970: p. 100).
The substantial increase in resource costs, coupled with growing dis-
satisfaction with the schools, has surely raised important questions about
the performance of the educational sector. In response, economists have
increasingly devoted their attentions to studying the internal efficiency
of the educational sector, and their early efforts suggest a natural bifur-
cation into camps of optimism and pessimism.
The pessimists have suggested that the very nature of such activities
as education must inevitably lead to higher real costs per unit of output.
William Baumol has systematized this analysis by viewing education as a
"technologically unprogressive" activity, where the latter term is applied
to those activities which cannot benefit from innovation, capital accumu-
lation and economies of large scale (Baumol 1967). According to Baumol,
the labor intensive nature of education is an end in itself, so that the
possibilities for capital-labor substitution are limited severely. Assuming
that money wages rise according to increases in labor productivity within
the technologically progressive industries, these increases are passed
along to the nonprogressive sectors such as education in the form of
higher real costs per unit of output. Baumol concludes that the real costs
of even a constant level of output for nonprogressive industries such as
education will increase indefinitely and without limit. Note that the
Baumol model does not see costs rising because of inefficiency; rather
they are rising because of inevitability. Accordingly, his palliative seems
to be: "Don't send advice, send
Nevertheless, since economists have a greater predilection for provid-
ing advice than for fund raising, most economists who have concerned
themselves with the educational sector have tactitly assumed that pro-
ductivity in education can be improved. They are the optimists, since
they see their own approaches as ones which will lead to greater ef-
ficiency in educational spending. While both Adam Smith and Milton
Friedman belong in this school, it is primarily the economists who have
attempted to estimate educational production functions that are included
in the present analysis.' Their studies have generally been addressed to
estimating the pioduction set for education with the hope that the
marginal products obtained can be compared with prices to obtain a
least-cost solution to eduèational production (Bowles 1970; Katzman
1971; Per1 1973; Winkler 1972; Thomas 1971; Burkhead et al.1967;
Brown and 'Saks 1975; Kiesling 1967; Hanushek 1968, 1972; Levin
1970a, 1970b; Michelson 1970; Murnane 1974). The tacit assumption
underlying such investigations is that schools are allocatively inefficient,
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resource allocation in the educational sector. Some of the formidable
obstacles to estimating these relationships have also been explored in
some detail (Bowles 1970; Bowles and Levin 1968a and 1968b; Michel-
son 1970; Levin 1970a and 1974). Moreover the findings of these studies
have been discussed in a public policy context (Guthrie, Kleindorfer,
Levin, and Stout 1971; Kiesling. 1971; Hanushek 1972; Bowles 1970;
Levin 1970b; Hanushek and Kain 1972; Cain and Watts 1970; and Jencks
et al.1972).
Yet, in my opinion, scant attention has been devoted to the relevance
of these approaches to questions of efficiency in educational production.
The purpose of this paper is to explore several concepts of efficiency
with regard to their role in enabling us to evaluate the production of
education. That is, if the purpose of the educational production-function
literatureisto derive prescriptive decision rules for improving the
effectiveness of resource use in the educational sector, it is crucial that
we examine the nature of the problem and the relevance of our tools for
solving it before applying them to the evaluative task.
EducationalProduction Functions.
Thegeneral production function that appears common to most educa-
tional studies is reflected in (1).
(1) A = g(Ft>, S(I)' IIt), 0 (ii, I)
The i subscript refers to the ith student; the t subscript in parentheses
(t) refers to an input that is cumulative to time period t.
I
A it= avector of educational outcomes for the ith student at time t;
=avector of individual and family background characteristics cumu-
lative to time t;
S=avector of school inputs relevant to the ith student cumulative to
time t;
=avector of peer or fellow-student characteristics cumulative to time t;
=avector of other external influences (community, etc.) relevant to
the ith student cumulative to time t; and
lit =avector of initial or innate endowments of the ith student at the time t.
We might view (1) as a capital-embodiment approach to education, since
output in time periodis mainly a function of inputs cumulative to t
from some earlier time.2 That is, clearly the educational outcomes at a
point in time for an individual, a school, or a larger social collectivity are
influenced not only by present observed circumstances but by past ones
as well. It is reasonable to believe that from the time a child is conceived
151 HenryM.Levinvarious environmental characteristics combine with his innate charac- specification bia
teristics to mold his behavior. In the context of (1) the educational number of
outcome for the individual is determined by the cumulative amounts of the observedr
"capital" embodied in him by his family, his school, his community, and student achieve:
his peers as well as by his innate traits. The greater the amount and the the teacher's V(
qualityof investment from each of these sources, the higher will be the While teache
output. More specifically, the family provides a material, intellectual, achievement or
nutritional, and emotional set of inputs which are embodied'in the child; rarely shown su
and the schools, peer groups, media, and so on also provide flows of certification stal
inputs over time which increase capital embodiment.3 show no appare
The operational formulation of (1)is subject to large errors in the studies have fo
equations and in the variables (Bowles 1970; Michelson 1970; Levin pupil performar
1970a). Most studies have used only a single measure of output, scores
on standardized achievement tests,despite the fact that schools are
expected to produce a variety of attitudes and skills. Specification of the
input structure has been based in part upon what data are available, in
part upon the researcher's hunch, and only to a very small degree on II.SOME CONC
theoriesof development and learning.4
Family and background inputs generally include such measures of
. Technical and socialclass as parental education, fatner s occupation, ramny possessions,
1 . . E ucationai Proi familystructure, race ana sex or stuaents. Scnooi cnaracteristrcs nave
included such facilities as libraries, laboratories, age and nature of build- It is useful at ti
ings; personnel inputs (with special emphasis on class size) and such allocative. Techi
teacher traits as experience, education, attitudes, and verbal aptitudes. such a way that
Peer influences include the social class and racial characteristics of fellow alternative
students, and other influences include community variables and certain ficiency, or pric
residual variables. The difficulty of obtaining valid measures of innate that, given relat
characteristics has meant that such variables have been omitted from the is obtained.
econometric models. These omissions have probably resulted in an budgetary const
upward bias in the estimated coefficients of family and background output (Farrell
variables.5 One of the m
In all of these studies, student background measures appear to be educational prod
highly related to educational achievement.6 Among school characteris- that is, that the
tics, some facilities measures appear to show significant statistical rela- have selected.7
tionships, but the most consistent relations are found between teacher production isoqi
variables and academic achievement. Specifically, virtually all of the thought of as sd
studies that have measured teacher verbal aptitudes have found that constant educati
variable to be significantly related to student achievement (Coleman tion frontier and
1966; Hanushek 1972; Bowles and Levin 1968; Michelson 1970; Levin are to the north
1970a). Indeed, the consistency of this finding is buttressed by the fact not technically
that separate studies have been carried out at several grade levels and require higher
for samples of black, white, and Mexican-American students (Hanushek reasons for such
1972). Of course,itis important to point out that in the light of inefficient schoo
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specification biases, the teacher's verbal score may be a proxy for a large
number of possible cognitive and personal traits of the teacher; so that
•the observed relationship between the teacher's verbal pattern and
student achievement may derive from these associated traits rather than
the teacher's verbal proficiencies per se (Griliches, 1957).
While teacher experience has also been found to be related to student
achievement on a fairly regular basis, the teacher's degree level has
rarely shown such an effect. Moreover, variables reflecting the teacher's
certification status on the basis of existing state requirements seem to
show no apparent association with student achievement. Finally, most
studies have found no statistical effect of differences in class-size on
pupil performance.
II.SOME CONCEPTS OF EFFICIENCY
Technical and Allocative Efficiency in
Educational Production
Itis useful at the outset to define two types of efficiency, technical and
allocative. Technical efficiency refers to organizing available resources in
such a way that the maximum feasible output is produced. That is, no
alternative organization would yield a larger output. Allocative ef-
ficiency, or price efficiency, refers to use of the budget in such a way
that, given relative prices, the most productive combination of resources
is obtained. That is, no alternative combination of resources, given the
budgetary constraint, would enable the organization to produce a higher
output (Farrell 1957; Leibenstein 1966).
One of the major assumptions that tacitly underlies the estimation of
educational production functions is that schools are technically efficient,
that is, that they are maximizing output given the input mix that they
have selected.7 In Figure 1 the production frontier is depicted by the
production isoquant AoAo', where the individual observations can be
thought of as schools using various combinations of S1 and S2 to produce
constant educational output Ao. Schools a, b, and c are on the produc-
tion frontier and are thus technically efficient. All of the other schools
are to the northeast of the production frontier suggesting that they are
not technically efficient. That is,all schools other than a,b, and c
require higher levels of factor inputs to obtain the output Ao. The
reasons for such inefficiencies will be suggested below, but if technically
inefficient schools are prevalent, then statistical estimates of the educa-



















































Production Frontier for Schools FIGURE 1
tionalproduction will not be frontier ones even in the absence of errors
in the equations or variables.
If we assume that Z'Z is the relative price or iso-cost line facing all
schools for the two factors, only school b is both technically efficient and
price or allocatively efficient. Firms a and c are technically efficient, but
they are clearly allocatively inefficient since they require a higher
budget to achieve output Ao' than would be required if they were at
point b. Indeed, the underlying goal of the educational production




Figure1 assumes a single-valued output for the educational firm that is
signified byA. Yet, schools are multi-product firms, soA =(a1, a2, a3
aByassuming a value for A, the analysis overlooks another important
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efficiency aspect which we might call overall social efficiency. That is,
•somehow the A obtained for any given budget must maximize social
welfare. Since the various outputs comprising A probably have different
corresponding values for different individuals, it may be impossible to
derive a structure of outputs for any given input that maximizes individ-
ual welftire and total social welfare (Arrow 1951; Little 1950; Dahl and
Lindblom 1953). Perhaps even more important, without having some
way of communicating true "social" preferences among outcomes to the
schools, it is possible that emphasis on productive efficiency may lead
simply to the efficient production of nonoptimal bundles of outputs
(Williams 1970).
Figure 2 illustrates this situation for the two output case. AA' repre-
sents a product transformation schedule between educational outputs
and a2.andrepresent social indifference curves for the two outputs
such thatrepresents a higher level of satisfaction than 10. It is obvious
that given the production possibilities and community preferences, the
highest level of welfare is represented by E1.
Now suppose that actual combination of outputs produced is
represented by E0. E0 represents an efficiently produced bundle of
outputs since it lies on the production frontier. It is evident that E0 gives
the community less satisfaction than E1, but more importantly any
choice of outputs within the shaded portion of the diagram (e.g., E 2) will
yield a higher level of welfare than E0. That is,a large number of
subfrontier choices make the community happier than any point on the
frontier except E1. Stated another way, it may be better to produce
inefficiently that which is highly desirable to the community than to
produce with perfect efficiency that which is of low value.8
Efficiencyand Scale
Thus,we have identified three types of efficiency which might be
applied to an analysis of the educational sector: technical efficiency,
allocative efficiency, and social welfare efficiency. A fourth type is one
that we shall not explore here in detail, that of size efficiency. Even
given technical and allocative efficiency as well as the "correct" choice of
outputs for all firms in the education industry, inefficiencies might be
introduced if the firms are too large or too small. Given the enormous
size variation of individual schools and school districts, it is possible that
both economies and diseconomies of scale exist.9 Empirical work in this
area has been carried out, but findings must be heavily qualified, given
the enormous errors that are imposed by lack of a sound theoretical
structure and measurement problems (Kiesling 1967; Kiesling 1968;
Riew 1966; Cohn 1968).
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Social Welfare and Choice of Output Combinations
III. BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR
EDUCATIONAL FIRMS
The major reason for believing that private firms are efficient derives
from market theory. The incentive of profit maximization in combination
with the pressure of competition can be reasonably expected to move
firms (and the industry) towards both technical and allocative efficiency,
provided that certain other conditions exist. Moreover, the existence of
market prices for outputs enables the multi-product firms (and the
industry) to evaluate all outputs in terms of their contribution to reve-
nue.'0
Let us list explicitly a few of the conditions which underlie our
expectations of efficiency in the private sector." While these categories
are not mutually exclusive, each emphasizes an aspect of competitive
supply that can be scrutinized foritsapplicabilityto educational
suppliers in the public sector. The first two categories refer to technical




























































structure and market information; and the final two refer to the exis-
tence and visibility of managerial incentives that relate to the outcomes
of the firm. Technical efficiency for an industry presumes that there
exist:
1.managerial knowledge of the technical production process;
2.substantial managerial discretion over input mix;
3.a basic competitive environment with all of its attendant assump-
tions (freedom of entry, many firms, perfect information);
4.managerial knowledge of prices for both inputs and outputs;
5.an objective function that is consistent with maximizing output
such as profit maximization; and
6.clear signals of success or failure (profits, losses, sales, costs, rate
of return, share of market).
Of course, to the degree that these do not hold, private firms can be
expected to be inefficient, both technically and allocatively and with
regard to scale. Indeed, in recent years economists have recognized
increasingly the possibilities of technical inefficiency for firms, a possibil-
ity that was once assumed away by the textbook version of pure competi-
tion (Farrell 1957; Leibenstein 1966; Nerlove 1965, Chapter 7; Aigner
and Chu 1968; Timmer 1969 and 1971; Comanor and Leibenstein 1969;
Lau and Yotopoulas 1971 and 1973).
The question that we wish to pose is: Do parallel conditions exist for
such public firms as schools or school districts that would ensure
efficient behavior in producing education? The answer seems to be a
resounding No. For virtually every condition stipulated above, the
schools appear to be at the opposite end of the spectrum from that of the
supplier in the competitive marketplace.
1.The educational managers at all levels lack knowledge of the
production set for obtaining particular outcomes. The educational pro-
cess is so complex and outputs are so diverse that relations between
inputs and outputs are difficult to derive whether by casual observation
or research. Salter defines three levels of technological knowledge that
relate to production: (a) the basic principles of physical (or behavioral)
phenomena; (b) the application of these principles to production, the
engineering level; and (c) the level that relates to day-to-day operations
(Salter 1960, p. 13). The sparsity of data at all three levels confronts the
educational manager, just asit confronts the educational researcher.
Moreover, schools do not possess management information systems that
are sophisticated enough to obtain even approximate relationships be-
tween changes in practices and educational outcomes (Hanushek and
Levin 1969). The result is that neither science nor trial and error yields
much insight to the educational manager on the nature of the production
set.
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2.Substantial management discretion does not exist over which in- laws promises
puts are obtained and how they are organized in educational production. performs. Inde
School administrators make very few decisions regarding the purchase performance gc
and organization of school inputs. In part, this dereliction is due to since a captive
direct limitations on managerial discretion; in part it derives from the Of course, U
lack of knowledge of the production set; and in part it derives from an Thus, one mu
inbred reverence for existing practices. Each of these phenomena rein- individual fami
forces the other,for when production relations are ambiguous and responsive. Th4
organizations are governed by mandates, managers learn to avoid deci- little ability to
sions and obey the rules. Any violation of the rules or the status quo is a lacks informatjo
risk for which educational payoffs can rarely be demonstrated convinc- by extensive Pu
ingly to all observers, many states ha
The "rules" for operating the schools derive from many sources, operations in a
federal, state, local, and the vast legacy of traditional and, thus, sac- and the schools
rosanct practices. At the federal level there exist particular guidelines for data on the ed
the expenditure of federal educational funds for each category for which Levin 1969; C
funds are available. More inhibiting is the fact that in many states the school boards
laws regulating the schools fill so many volumes that they require a mands, since th
substantial bookshelf for nesting. These codes affect virtually every als than with t
portion of school operations from the important to the minuwule. In themselves lad
addition,thestatedepartmentsof educationpossesstheir own Cittell 1967; Ia
labyrinths of operational minutiae which are imposed upon local school Perhaps
systems. While matters of personnel licensing and personnel ratios are themselves to
two of the better known areas of control, most states can even dictate whether these
the specific books that will be used in a particular class.'2 satory educatioi
Other factors that circumscribe the ability of managers to make sub- Indeed, they c
stantial changes include local regulations and regional accreditation re- sclerosis," a m
quirements. Moreover, negotiated contracts with educational personnel painful and un
have increasingly been used to stipulate in great detail the most uniform characterized b
system of employment for a productive activity that lacks inherent community con
uniformity. Finally, as we shall note below, the reward structure for thrown in the
managers discourages risk taking, since salaries and promotion are based in, the traditioi
primarily on seniority and docility rather than on any educationally 4.Prices of
meaningful sense of leadership. All of these factors inhibit substantial educational ma
managerial discretion in operating educational institutions, information sys1
3.Little or no competition exists among schools. With the exception the markets for
of nominal competition among school districts for families who can afford of the charactei
to migrate, there is no competition for students.'3 Usually the school productivity ha'
that a child attends is determined simply by the attendance area in
, soon. Clearly, i
whichhe lives. Rarely does he have a choice of schools to attend, even for purposes of
among those within the school district. Thus, most schools possess one of these c
monopoly powers that would be the envy of any monopolistic industry, embodied in ti
The combination of assignment practices and compulsory attendance data on costs ai










































laws promises a clientele for the school no matter how poorly the school
performs. Indeed, as we shall see below, these factors assure that good
performance goes unrewarded and poor performance is uncensured,
since a captive audience is always guaranteed.'4
Of course, the schools are not market institutions, but political ones.
Thus, one must ask what system of political sanctions exists for an
individual family or group of citizens to ensure that schools will be
responsive. The answer to this must surely be that the public has very
little ability to affect what is happening in the schools. First, the public
lacks information on both local schools and education itself as evidenced
by extensive public opinion sampling (Gallup 1969, pp. 4—7). Moreover,
many states have laws preventing citizens from "interfering" in school
operations in any way including visiting of schools without permission,
and the schools seem to be exceedingly deficient in providing desirable
data on the educational process (Gallup 1969, pp. 8—9; Hanushek and
Levin 1969; Coleman and Karweit 1969; Wynne 1972). Second, the
school boards themselves seem to lack the ability to respond to de-
mands, since they tend to identify more with the educational profession-
als than with their citizens on matters of educational policy, and they
themselves lack the sanctions to change most outcomes (Lyke 1970;
Gittell 1967; lannacone 1967).
Perhaps worst of all, the school bureaucracies have generally shown
themselves to be incapable of carrying out major changes in policy,
whether these be school desegregation, curriculum reform, or compen-
satory education (Rogers 1968; Schrag 1967; Gittell and Hollander 1968).
Indeed, they can best be described as suffering from "organizational
sclerosis," a malady that makes a movement from the status quo both
painful and unnatural (Jencks 1966; Rogers 1968). This frustration is
characterized by demands for accountability, and even the pressures for
community control of schools are principally a reaction to the red tape
thrown in the paths of citizens who seek information about, or changes
in, the traditional school regimen (Levin 1970c).
4.Prices of both inputs and outputs are not readily available to
educational managers. In part, this is due to the inadequacy of school
information systems, but in larger measure it is due to the complexity of
the markets for educational inputs and outputs. On the input side, most
of the characteristics that have been associated with higher educational
productivity have been such teacher traits as attitudes, verbal score, and
so on. Clearly, it is difficult to disembody these particular characteristics
for purposes of pricing, and it may also be difficult to obtain more of any
one of these characteristics per se without obtaining others that are
embodied in the same person (Levin 1968, Chapters 6—8). Available
data on costs are not related to homogeneous inputs. Rather, they are
159 Henry M. Levinlinked to line-item accounts or to objects that are not standardized with
regard to quality, such as principals' salaries, materials, and so on (U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1957). Even the plan-
ning, programming, and budgeting systems that have been designed for
the schools do not begin to make inroads into the quests for obtaining
specific prices or unit costs (Hartley 1968; Mushkin and Pollak 1970).
Prices for outputs are nonexistent in a market sense. Yet, the schools
are expected to produce a large number of outcomes including job
preparation, literacy, transmission of knowledge, and democratic val-
ues.'5 In theory, referendums and representative governance of schools
might be used to reasonably reflect priorities among outputs in the
absence of prices. Unfortunately, the political realities suggest that the
values of significant proportions of the population are not reflected in the
decision process because of imperfect information, inadequate political
institutions,and communication gaps between those whose values
should be considered and those who actually implement the decisions
(Lyke 1970; Jencks 1966; Gittell 1970; Rogers 1968).
5.The incentive or reward structures characteristic of schools seem
to have little relation to the declared educational goals of those institu-
tions. Financial rewards and promotions for school personnel are handed
out primarily on the basis of seniority and accumulation of college
credits rather than on demonstrated effectiveness. Individual schools,
teachers, or administrators who are successful in achieving important
educational goals are treated similarly to those who are unsuccessful,
mediocre, or incompetent. In lockstep fashion,the schools reward
equally all personnel with the same nominal characteristics, regardless of
differences in performance (Kershaw and McKean 1962; Levin 1968).
That is,success is not compensated or formally recognized, and the
reward structure is divorced systematically from educational outcomes.'6
In contrast, commercial enterprises tend to compensate their person-
nel on the basis of the contributions of employees to the effectiveness of
the organization. Commissions for sales personnel, bonuses, promotions,
profits, and salary increases all represent rewards for individual or
organizational proficiencies that do not seem to have their counterparts,
in an output-oriented sense, in the schools.
6.Finally, there are no clear signals of success or failure for the
schools that are comparable to sales, profits, losses, rates of return, or
shares of market. Such standard measures as test scores and proportion
of students graduating or gaining college entry are so heavily deter-
mined by factors beyond the school's control, such as students' social
class and cultural antecedents, that itis difficult to disentangle school
influences from nonschool influences.Moreover, since education is
essentially a dynamic process, the effects of present policy changes may








of the schools isj
StandardizedA
Butif schools c






































































only be discernible in the distant future. Furthermore, observation of
dynamic effects is obscured by mobility and dynamic changes in social
structure that prevent observations on how well school policies have
succeeded or failed. Moreover, the multiplicity of outcomes and the lack
of concise measures for most of them substantially limit the ability just to
observe the school's effects, even if the influence of other factors could
be removed. Thus, informational feedback on operational performance
of the schools is neither visible nor easily obtainable from existing data.
StandardizedAchievement as Educational Output
Butif schools cannot be appropriately viewed as acting like competitive
suppliers, it is erroneous to assume that they are maximizing the socially
optimal mix of educational outputs for any given set of resources. This
fact becomes especially important when one considers that most studies
of educational production functions have simply assumed that schools
are maximizing a single output, the achievement scores of their stu-
dents. Even those analyses that do acknowledge the multi-product na-
ture of schools generally limit their inquiry exclusively to test scores
(Hanushek 1972, pp. 20—26). The usual presumption is that we know
very little about the nature of measurement of other outputs in compari-
son with our understanding of, and ability to measure, cognitive skills.
Yet the omission of other outputs in the estimation of educational
production functions will lead to a biased set of estimated production
coeflicients even for the achievement output if the other outputs are not
strict complements of achievement in the production process.
The evidence suggests that schools are not attempting to maximize
achievement scores even when their official rhetoric indicates this as a
goal. This is best illustrated by the experience under Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Since 1965—66 over
one billion dollars a year has been allocated by the federal government
to schools educating children from low-income families. In applying for
the money local school districts were required to state the purposes and
design of their Title I programs, and they were required to evaluate the
results of their efforts. Thus, we can take for granted that the school's
specific goals under the program were the ones that they stated, and we
can focus on those outcomes. Moreover, the funds allocated to such
programs represented approximately half again as much as what was
presently being spent on each eligible child, so one might have expected
their marginal impact to be substantial.
Since most of the programs concentrated on reading skills, it is useful
to evaluate the effect of Title I funds on that outcome. In evaluating the
161 Henry M. Levin1966—67 and 1967—68 Title I funded reading programs, the U. S. Office (physical educ
of Education found that on the basis of reading test scores, "a child who incentives (n-ia
participated in a Title I project had only a 19% chance of a significant pay and
a a significant achievement loss, and a analysis
68% chance of no change atall[relativeto the national norms]" outputs of sch
(Picariello 1969, p.1). Further, the projects included in the investiga- Yet,in or
tion were "most likely to be representative of projects in which there achievement,
was a higher than average investment in resources. Therefore more production frc
significant achievement gains should be found here than in a more sent the maxji
representative sample of Title I projects." being utilized.
This inability to create even a nominal direct impact on specific cognitive achi
objectives appears to be endemic. Among many thousands of Title I since it is
project evaluations, the U.S. Office of Education selected the 1,000 reduces the a:
most promising for purposes of further scrutiny by an independent case, it is obv
research contractor. Of these, only 21 seemed to have shown sufficient consider only
evidence of significant pupil achievement gains in language or numerical us estimates
skills (Hawkridge, Chalupsky, and Roberts 1968). A more recent analysis be obtained b
has shown a similar pattern of failure to improve test scores (Wargo et al. zero.
1972). The obviou
Moreover, studies of school processes and organization suggest that product case
there are other agenda that dominate the educational production func- of the outputs
tion (Jackson 1968; Dreeben 1968). Gintis (1971) has found that grades conceptual ou
and other social rewards of schooling are more consistently correlated relationships t
with the personality attributes of students than with their cognitive nonachieveme
achievement scores. It is not even apparent that the cognitive compo- that almost e
nent of schooling as reflected by student test scores has as large an production fun
economic impact as other outputs of the educational process. For exam- output.'8 In r
ple, studies of earnings functions suggest that the inclusion of a variable nored or the
measuring the cognitive performance of individuals (as reflected in test perfect joint
scores) reduces by only a modest amount the observed earnings As we noted,
coefficient for schooling (Taubman and Wales 1973; Griliches and Mason
1972; and Gintis 1971). Presumably, the explanation for this phenome-
non is that the other outputs of education that are quite independent of
test scores tend to be the ones that have the principal impact on
earnings (Bowles and Ne son 1974; Bow es anGintis 19 3). STUDENT Amore insightful analysis of the relationship between educational IMPLICATI productionand labor market success seems to be reflected in the recent
work of Bowles (1972) and Cintis (1971) and Bowles and Gintis (1975). In the previc
These studies suggest that the principal purpose of schools is to repro- believing that
duce the social relations of production, and that achievement scores are ment and
only one component of the productive hierarchy. "The school isa counterpart fo
bureaucratic order with hierarchical authority, rule-orientation, strat- late the prod
ification of 'ability' (tracking) as well as by age, role differentiation by sex maximize ach
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(physical education, home economics, shop) and a system of external
incentives (marks, promise of promotion, and threat of failure) much like
pay and status in the sphere of work" (S. Bowles, 1973, p. 353). This
analysis suggests that educational achievement is only one of the many
outputs of schooling, and it is not necessarily the most important one.
Yet,in order to estimate a production function for educational
achievement, we must assume that all schools are operating on the
production frontier for thi,s output, so that the observed relations repre-
sent the maximum output that can be produced with the inputs that are
being utilized. The fact that schools are producing other outputs besides
cognitive achievement raises questions about this assumption,
since it is reasonable to believe that the production of other outputs
reduces the amount of cognitive learning that will be produced. In this
case, it is obvious that statistical estimates among existing schools that
consider only the achievement score outcomes of students will not give
us estimates of the production frontier, since more achievement could
be obtained by reducing the levels of all noncomplementary outputs to
zero.
The obvious answer to estimating production functions in the multi-
product case is to specify a system of equations that takes into account all
of the outputs of schooling. Unfortunately, our overall ignorance of the
conceptual outputs of schools, their measurement, and their structural
relationships to one another and to inputs, limits our ability to include
nonachievement outputs in the analysis. The result of these limitations is
that almost every study that has attempted to estimate educational
production functions has considered only educational achievement as an
output.'8 In most cases, the obvious problems involved are either ig-
nored or the assumption is made that all other outputs are produced as
perfect joint products in exact fixed proportion to achievement scores.
As we noted, there is no empirical substantiation for this assumption.
IV.TECHNICAL INEFFICIENCY IN PRODUCING
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION
Inthe previous section we noted that there are many reasons for
believing that schools are not technically efficient in producing achieve-
ment and that the inefficiencies may be substantial.19 There is no
counterpart for the competitive environment of firms that would stimu-
late the production of achievement. Even if the school attempted to
maximize achievement, the effort would be limited by the imperfect
163 Henry M. Levinknowledge and limited discretion of school managers. Moreover, other Input S1
outputs compete with achievement for school resources. Yet, attempts
to estimate educational production functions that use achievement as the
output are based upon the tacit assumption that schools are producing as
much achievement as can be obtained with their resources. That is, they
are producing on the "achievement" frontier. But given the high proba-
bility of technical inefficiency, estimates of the production functions on
this output are likely to yield biased coefficients and misleading implica-
tions.
This situation is shown in Figure 3, which represents a hypothetical
input-input space where S1 and S2 represent two different school inputs
into the production of student achievement. Each observation repre-
sents the combination of S1 and S2 that a particular school is using to
produce a given amount of achievement output, Ao. That is, each school
in the sample is using a different input mix, even though the apparent
output is the same.
Isoquant Ao1 represents the production frontier defined as the locus of
all observations that minimize the combinations of S1 and S2 required to
produce constant product Ao. Presumably, these schools are producing
only the socially minimal required levels of other school outputs.2° Since
Ao1 is a mapping of the most efficient points for producing achievement
it is the production frontier. All observations to the northeast ofAo1
are of schools that are using higher input levels to produce
the same achievement.2' Now assume that we fit the observations statis-
tically via normal regression procedures. We obtain the statistical equiv- FIGURE3
alent of Ao2 for all schools (both efficient and inefficient ones). Of
course, all points on Ao2 are farther from the origin than those on Ao1,
showing that the average production relationship is a less efficient one
than the frontier relationship.
Since virtually all estimates of educational production have been based or
on the performance of both average and efficient schools rather than h 2
efficient ones only, the existing statistical studies of educational produc- =
tionare not production function studies in the frontier sense. Moreover,
their results may suggest erroneous conclusions about which combination Now consider
of inputs (programs) maximizes achievement for a given budget con- h', =h '1and f
straint. For example, assume the two-input production function canbe defli
(2) A=h(S,S2)
/1 —'I —
Inequilibrium, we would wish to satisfy the conditions set out in (3), '"
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Now consider two different values for h'1 and h'2. At the frontier,
h'1, and for the average of all schools, h'1 =h'1.The symbols for
can be defined in the same way.
(4)
Il'2 Il'2 P2
(4) reiterates the necessary conditions for a maximum, both for frontier
estimates and for average estimates of the production function. In both
165 HenryM. Levincases, we wish to select the combination of inputs that equates the ratios Input
of marginal products (first derivatives) to the ratios of prices.
Cl
Efficiency Implications of the Estimates
Ifwe estimate only the average production function or only the frontier
production function, can the optimal ratio of inputs derived from one
estimate also apply to the other? The answer to this question clearly
depends on whether there are differences in the structural parameters
associated with each input.
For example, it is possible that the inefficiencies of nonfrontier schools
are neutral among inputs so that at every level of input and for every
combination of inputs the ratios of the marginal products are identical for
both frontier and average functions. That is,(5) holds.
h =yhi(i =1,2)
'F
Thiscan be represented by Figure 4, where Ao1 signifies the production
isoquant for Ao for all efficient schools and Ao2 represents the same level
of output for the entire set of schools, efficient and inefficient. B1B2 and
C1C2 represent budget or iso-cost lines reflecting the various combina-
tions of S1 and S2 obtainable for two given cost constraints, B1B2 and
C1C2, where C1C2> The slope of the iso-cost lines is determined
by the ratio of the prices, P2/P1. Thus, E and F represent equilibrium FIGURE4
points which reflect (4). That is, the combination ofS1 and S2 that obtains
Ao for budget constraint B1B2 is determined by the tangency of Ao1 to
B1B2 at pointE for efficient or frontier schools and ofAo2 toC1C2 at point neutral among
F for schools on the average, such a way thr
It can be shown that the relative intensities of the two inputs will be greater than fi
identical for both groups of schools if a ray drawn from the origin evident in Fl
intersects both points of tangency. 0 M satisfies that condition, so the appears to be
same ratio of S1/S2 is optimal for both groups of schools. Whether we physical schoc
use the estimates of frontier schools or of all schools, the findings on the that the. organ
optimal combinations of S1 and S2 will be binding for both. In such a more harmful
case it does not matter which group we use to estimate the production achievement I
function, although the absolute product will be higher for the set of through the ot
schools at the frontier for any input level, sect both poir
The situation depicted in Figure 4 and defined by (5) is a kind of frontier school
happy state of affairs which would be desirable indeed for purposes of sect point F; r'
evaluation. Yet, there is no evident reason that such a fortuitous case schools at pol
should hold (Bowles 1970, pp. 16—17). Given technical inefficiencies in that represent
the production of education, it is likely that such inefficiencies are not schools will be
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FIGURE 4 Technical Inefficiency that is Neutral
betweenInputs
neutral among inputs. That is, the inefficient school may be organized in
such a way that the relative inefficiency in the use of one input may be
greater than for another.22 This can be shown in Figure 5, and it is also
evident in Figure 3. Here the relative inefficiency in the use of S1
appears to be greater than that for S2. For example, ifrepresents
physical school facilities and S2 represents teachers, Figure 5 suggests.
that the. organizational arrangements in inefficient schools are relatively
more harmful to the productivity of the facilities in increasing student
achievement than to that of the teachers. In this case, a ray drawn
through the origin representing a constant ratio of inputs will not inter-
sect both points of tangency. That is,the optimal ratio of S1/S2 for
frontier schools represented by 0 M intersecting point E will not inter-
sect point F; rather it intersects the production isoquant for the average
schools at point G, which is a more costly combination of inputs than
that represented at F. In short, the optimal ratio of S1/S2 for frontier





FIGURE 5 Technical Inefficiency that Is Biased
between Inputs
that input ratio (represented by 0 M) on the nonfrontier production set,
we shall recommend an allocatively inefficient set of inputs for the
nonfrontier firms.
Of course, the obverse is also true. If we were to base our estimates of
the production set on the entire group of schools, and we derived an
optimal input ratio based upon 0 N which intersects tangency point F,
we would impose an allocatively inefficient decision on frontier firms.
That is, in either case, the results that we obtain for one group of schools
cannot be applied to the other group. Rather each set of schools will
have its own optimal combination of S1/S2 depending on the relative
efficiencies with which these inputs are used. The point to be em-
phasized isthat even with estimates based upon perfectly specified
systems of equations for educational achievement, the input combina-
tions that might be considered optimal for the industry will actually lead
to a reduction in allocative efficiency for some educational firms. More
specifically, those schools on Ao2 using any combination of inputs within
















































= constant (frontier)G C' would operate with greater price or allocative efficiency by ignor-
ing the advice of economic studies of "frontier" firms.
Now it becomes obvious that under reasonable conditions, the advice
of economists using econometric approaches to estimating production
functions can actually lead to recommendations that would decrease the
allocative efficiency of the educational sector. Even with the same set of
prices, if every firm has a different set of marginal products such that the
marginal rates of substitution of factors differ from firm to firm, then any
prescriptive decision rule on optimal input combinations for the educa-
tional sector would have a high probability of producing a decrease in
allocative efficiency.
This prospect becomes clearer if we depict an industry composed of
three firms, Z1, Z2, and Z3. If we assume that each firm is operating on
its own "production frmnction," we can depict the individual unit product
isoquants for each firm as in Figure 6. Each firm is producing the same
level of achievement output, but the mappings of feasible factor combi-
nations differ. The assertion of this kind of idiosyncratic behavior derives
primarily from our contention that educational managers lack the com-.
petition, incentives, information, and discretion to move toward the
production frontier for achievement in any consistent way.
Further, assume that we wish to obtain a unit production isoquant for
the industry. Fitting a convex hull to points a, b, and c, we obtain an
approximation to the industry production frontier, ac.23 Though in this
case every firm's production surface is on the industry frontier, this
condition should not be assumed ordinarily. Rather the unit production
isoquants of some firms will be tangent to the frontier, while for others
this will not be true. Such a situation is perfectly consistent with that
described in Figure 1.
Figure 7 shows the conditions for maximizing allocative efficiency in
this three-firm case. If we assume that B1 B2 is the relative price or
iso-cost line facing the industry, then tangency with ac is at point b.
That is,at point b it would appear that we would be obtaining the
optimal combination of S1/S2 for maximizing allocative efficiency. Now
assume that each educational firm accepts the recommendation of this
industry evaluation with regard to the optimal ratio of s1/S2for maximiz-
ing its allocative efficiency. Line 0 M is drawn from the origin through
point b to indicate the constant ratio of S1/S2 that was derived for the
industry. In following this recommendation, firm Z1 would select com-
bination R; firm Z2 would select combination b; and firm Z3 would select
combination Q.Whatis the effect on allocative efficiency for each firm?
By coincidence, the iso-cost line B1 B2,the production isoquant for
firm Z2, and the estimated frontier for the industry ac are all tangent at
the same point. Therefore the choice of b is allocatively efficient for firm
Z2. Following the evaluation recommendations, firm Z selected point R



















inputs withinInput Si Input S1
0 Input
FIGURE 6 Approximating the Industry Production Surface for
Three Firms FIGURE 7 M
oniso-cost line aR. Yet it is obvious that Z1 would be more efficient by
producing at R1 which is tangent to iso-cost line C1 C2. Indeed, even if
firm Z1 were not at point R1, the choice of combination R could
decrease its efficiency; for any selection of input combinations between
point a and point R would be superior to R.
A similar situation exists for firm Z3. The manager of Z3 believes fully
in using the findings of "scientific" research and evaluation activity in
making his choices. Accordingly, he selects input combination Qwith
the expectation that his firm will be allocatively efficient. Yet, factor
combination Qi is tangent to a lower iso-cost line D1D2, and any input
combination between c and W would be superior to Q.
Introducing Further Inefficiencies in
Educational Production
Insummary, by believing and implementing the results of the industry
evaluation, the industry became less efficient rather than more efficient.








useful tools of m
single estimate
will solve this pi
firm to firm,
allocative effick






















FIGURE 7 Maximizing Allocative Efficiency for the Three-Firm
Industry
Yet,the techniques of evaluation were based upon the enormously
useful tools of microeconomic analysis. Further, as Figure 7 suggests, no
single estimate of the industry's production function for achievement
will solve this problem. That is, optimal factor proportions will vary from
firm to firm, and a uniform adoption for the industry will reduce overall
allocative efficiency. Moreover, even this analysis has assumed that
there will be no errors in the estimation of the relationships and that the
same relative prices are applicable to each firm. The fact that neither of
these assumptions are valid buttresses further the argument that ef-
ficiency recommendations based upon statistical production functions of
student achievement for the education industry (or a segment of it) can
be more harmful than beneficial to sectoral efficiency.
Bear in mind that at the present time we cannot identify or measure
most educational outputs, and we are woefully ignorant of the proper
specification and measurement of the input structures. Further, since
the lion's share of the school budget is spent on personnel, one must




more efficient.raise the question whether teacher "prices" are the same for every
stimuli muchc school or school district. Among labor markets this is not likely to be so, than thepages but even within a school district a set of teachers with given characteris-
foolish forany I ticsare not indifferent about the schools in which they teach. For the
such studies same salary level,teachers prefer to work in schools attended by
The situatjo middle-class youngsters, and in suburban areas, rather than those at-
enterprises. ii tended by lower-class and minority youngsters in rural or highly ur-
tion, education banized areas (H. Becker 1952; Herriott and St. John 1966, Chapter 5). form decisiono As one might expect, the relative preferences of teachers for specific This penchant. school sites is reflected in the salaries required to obtain teachers for
of many of the particular schools.24
teachers, and For the very reasons stated above, it is not possible to test adequately reflected intl the hypothesis that the production set differs among educational firms.
Moreover, the Such a test would require a better specified model than the present state go unquestione of the art will support. Nevertheless, for those who like the feel of areas just inten numbers (even unreliable ones), I have used the appendix to compare the "emperor's
estimates of educational production functions at the "frontier" with those
. attirepreferabl
for a large sample of sixth graders, in toto. Such an empirical operation indistinguishabl is relegated to the appendix because it is meant to be provocative rather
than definitive. Indeed, no numerical result derived from this exercise
should be taken seriously.25
Of course, it is possible that parallel and serious problems arise in an
analysis of private sector industries, leaving those studies open to er- V. SUMMARY
roneousconclusions. Yet, there is a quantum difference in the possible Rising costs of impact of erroneous findings in those cases in comparison with such quality have ra findings in an evaluation of the education industry. The main difference sector. One apr is that private firms will tend to decide their input combinations on the education is to basis of the peculiar circumstances facing them rather than on average output; to relate
"results" for the industry.26 Further, the higher the level of aggregation make policy re of firms, the more inapplicable the results would appear to any rea- raise the allocal
sonably proficient manager. Since most studies of the industry produc- cent years a la tion function use state averages as units of observation, it would be production func unlikely that any particular firm would identify with such results.27 made to compa]
For example, Griliches carried out a set of studies on agricultural But, in order
production functions (Griliches 1963, 1964). Using 39 states as "firms" outputs to
and an unrestricted Cobb-Douglas equation, he found a ratio of marginal with the resourc
revenue product to marginal cost of about 3 to 5 for fertilizer (Griliches production
1964). At the time, he notes that fertilizer use was growing at a tre- functions, it is a mendous rate in reaction to the disequilibrium (p.968). What is conjunction with
noteworthy here is that Griliches saw natural market forces moving that firms operat
agriculture toward allocative efficiency in a dynamic setting. He did not and allocatively
intend his study to be used by individual farmers to make decisions. environment nor
Rather he tacitly viewed their managerial behavior as being a function of ascribe to compe
172
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stimuli much closer to their productive operations and more influential
than the pages of economic journals. Indeed, it would be exceedingly
foolish for any farmer to base his factor hiring decisions on the results of
such studies.
The situation is entirely different for the schools and other public
enterprises. The U.S. Office of Education, state departments of educa-
tion, educational researchers, and school managers search out the uni-
form decision or recommendation with the hope of applying it generally.
This penchant for standardizing input proportions is reflected in the laws
of many of the states that require very specific ratios of administrators to
teachers, and of teachers and other professional staff to students. It is
reflected in the policy prescriptions of most educational reports.28
Moreover, the fact that results derived from modern analytic tools often
go unquestioned because many decision makers lack training in these
areas just intensifies the problem. There is an increasing desire to try on
the "emperor's new clothes" by educational managers who find this
attire preferable to the dull and monotonous garb which makes them
indistinguishable from other bureaucratic chieftains.
lems arise in an
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V. SUMMARY
I
Rising costs of education in conjunction with persistent concerns about
quality have raised questions about the efficiency of the educational
sector. One approach to improving the effectiveness of resource use in
education is to estimate the technical production set for educational
output; to relate the technical coefficients to prices of the inputs; and to
make policy recommendations on the basis of these analyses that will
raise the allocative efficiency of the educational enterprise. Within re-
cent years a large number of studies have estimated an educational
production function for student achievement, and an attempt has been
made to compare marginal products with prices.
But, in order for observed statistical relations between inputs and
outputs to reflect the maximum amount of input that can be obtained
with the resources being utilized, all firms in the sample must be on the
production frontier.In conventional analyses of industry production
functions, it is assumed that the nature of a competitive environment in
conjunction with the goal of profit maximization would tend to ensure
that firms operating in competitive industries would be both technically
and allocatively efficient. But, schools neither operate in a competitive
environment nor do they have most of the other characteristics that we
ascribe to competitive firms. Accordingly, it is not reasonable to believe
173 Henry M. Levinthat schools are operating on the production frontiers for the particular this direction
outputs that we believe that they should be producing. production of:
Virtually all attempts to estimate educational production have spec- productionsel
ified educational achievement as reflected in test scores as the appropri- function studi
ate output of the educational process. We have shown that there is they may alsc
abundant evidence in conflict with the view that schools are attempting
to maximize achievement scores. Accordingly, it does not seem reason-
able that educational firms are operating on the production frontier for
student achievement, and estimates of production functions among APPENDIX
schoolswill not be likely to yield the appropriate technical coefficients
that show the maximum amount of educational achievement that can be
obtained with a given set of resource inputs. Moreover, it is likely that A Temerarious
usingthe results of such studies for policy could decrease the economic
efficiency of the educational industry with respect to the production of The major difi
achievement rather than improving it. of the foregoi
It would seem that a more productive approach to future research in easier to obtai
this area would be to attempt to ascertain a behavioral theory of schools cally, The par
that describes what schools are producing and how they are doing it.29 tions have be
Such studies would investigate the internal processes of educational (Bowles 1970;
enterprises as well as the various types of outcomes that they produce. it is useful to r
They would also study the interface between schools and their external in the equatto
environment in order to determine the types of political sanctions and the proper spe
other characteristics that create the existing operations of the schools structure of th
(Bowles and Gintis, 1975; Carnoy and Levin, 1976). This type of study relationship to
might also begin to explain what aspects of schooling in addition to are many
cognitive achievement affect adult income and other social outcomes. At variables used
the present time, our understanding of these relations is so inadequate ment error.
that we are applying concepts derived from the competitive theory of Thus, no St
the firm to bureaucratic, nonmarket institutions, and such an application ranted. Rathei
seems unjustified. generating nev
An important start in this direction is reflected in the work of Cintis results that we
(1971) and Bowles (1972 and 1973). According to their analyses, schools analysis before
serve to reproduce the socialrelations of production required by
capitalist enterprise. They trace the evolution of the American schools The Sample
through two periods of great change in the capitalist order (1830—90 and
1890—1930), and they assert that the changes in characteristics of school- The data set us
ing tended to mirror the changes in the demands of capitalist enterprises Survey on Equ
(Bowles and Gintis 1975). They have also related the internal activities of tion for the sch
schooling, including school organization and grading practices, to worker white sixth
characteristics that have been linked to productivity and earnings in were enrolled
hierarchical work settings. At the very least, their findings suggest that and recoded ex
the function of schools is considerably more complex than the maximiza- ships, so they
tion of student achievement. It would seem that research endeavors in utilized inform:
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this direction would yield much more information about efficiency in the
production of schooling than the present naive approach to "estimating"
production sets. The most that can be said about the present production
function studies is that they are interesting and harmless; unfortunately,
they may also be misleading.
APPENDIX
j
A Temerarious Empirical Application
The major difficulty in demonstrating some of the empirical implications
of the foregoing analysis is that the necessary relationships are much
easier to obtain mathematically and geometrically than they are statisti-
cally. The particular problems in deriving educational production func-
tions have been described elsewhere, so they will not be detailed here
(Bowles 1970; Michelson 1970; Cain and Watts 1970; Levin 1970a). Yet
it is useful to note that the statistical work in this area is subject to errors
in the equations as well as errors in the variables. In the former case,
the proper specification of the model is still in the exploratory stage. The
structure of the model, the specific variables to be included, and their
relationship to one another have not been well established, and there
are many gaps in our knowledge. Moreover, most of the operational
variables used in the models are subject to varying degrees of measure-
ment error.
Thus, no strict application of our findings to public policy is war-
ranted. Rather, the empirical aspects are meant to be provocative in
generating new directions and thought on the process of evaluation. The
results that we derive must surely be subject to replication and further
analysis before they can be considered acceptable for policy evaluation.
The Sample
The data set used in this analysis represent a subsample drawn from the
Survey on Equal Educational Opportunity of the U.S. Office of Educa-
tion for the school year 1965—66. Specifically, it is composed of some 597
white sixth graders who had attended only the school in which they
were enrolled at the time of the survey.30 These data were reanalyzed
and recoded extensively for purposes of estimating the present relation-
ships, so they differ in important ways from other studies that have
utilized information from the same survey. There are some 29 schools
175 Henry M. Levinrepresented in the sample, and teacher characteristics represent the
averages for each school for all teachers who were assigned to grades 3
through 5. These averages were intended to reflect the teacher charac-
teristics that had influenced student behavior up to the time of the
survey. Moreover, it was assumed that the observed measures of family
background and other educational influences were related systematically
to the cumulative impacts of each of these variables.
The equation that we will use to explore differences between frontier
and average estimates will be a linear equation based on (1). Lineaiity
not only violates our assumptions about the second derivative, but it also
runs counter to our intuition about the real world. Yet, the difficulties of
estimating particular nonlinear functions and the risk of greater spec-
ification biases in the coefficients by imposing another arbitrary func-
tional form suggest that the linear equation might yield reasonable first
approximations to the estimates that we seek. Of course, this limits our
comparison of the frontier and average estimates to that of the linear
marginal products and price ratios.
The variables in the equation are shown in Table A-i. These variables
are taken from the reduced-form equation for verbal achievement de-
rived from a four-equation system encompassing three simultaneous
equations and one that represents a recursive relationship. Once that
system is estimated one can solve for the reduced-form equation for any
of the three endogenous variables. Since the estimation of that system is
discussed elsewhere, we shall concern ourselves only with the reduced
form of the verbal equation.31 This equation was fitted to the entire
sample of observations. Consequently, it represents the average produc-
tion relation for the sample of schools.Results are shown for this
estimate in the right column of Table A-2.
Obtaining Frontier Estimates
Using the same set of data and variables, we wish to obtain estimates of
the equation for only the most efficient observations, those on the
frontier. While there are several ways of doing this, we have chosen the
programming approach in input-output space suggested by Aigner and
Chu (1968). Since our individual observations are students rather than
schools, we wish to seek those students who show a particular outcome i...
withthe lowest application of resources. Using the general notation from
(1),the problem is to minimize (1-a).
(1-a)
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1in order to obtain a constant term. More specifically, we wish to
minimize (1-a) which can be rewritten as (2-a) subject to the constraints
(3-a).
(2-a) Mi + +... +
subject to:
&o+&IXII +... + ￿ 1'1
(3-a)
&,, + X1m+... + Xnm￿Ym
al ￿ 0
Sincethis is essentially a linear programming problem, there will be
as many "efficient" observations as there are inputs into the production
function (assuming that no two observations are identical). Yet, clearly
some of these firms will appear to be efficient when in fact the figures
represent measurement errors.32 Accordingly, a problem arises in that it
is impossible for us to know a priori whether a particular observation is
efficient or spurious. Following Tim mer we have discarded extreme
observations in order to eliminate what might be spurious points (Tim-
mer 1969). This is particularly important for the frontier estimates, since
very few observations determine the structural coefficients.
Table A-2 ëontrasts the frontier estimates with those for the average
function. Each of the coefficients represents the first derivative or mar-
ginal product of the function.33 Four linear programming runs were
used to obtain frontier estimates. Run 1 eliminated no observations; Run
2 discarded the nine most "efficient" points; Run 3 eliminated 23 obser-
vations; and Run 4 discarded the 38 most extreme points (or about 6 per
cent of the sample). We shall focus on the comparisons between the
frontier function from Run 4andthe average function. In doing this we
shall examine two properties of the estimates: (1) the relative mag-
nitudes of the coefficients; and (2) implications for allocative or price
efficiency.
Recall that in order for evaluation findings of optimal input intensities
to yield the same relative applications of inputs for both average and
frontier schools, the marginal products for both functions must bear a
constant relation to each other as reflected in (5). Table A-3 shows the
ratios of marginal products for the two sets of estimates for all of the
school variables. According to this table, there is no obvious systematic
relationship between the two sets, and some of the coefficients, such as
teacher's verbal score, are different at statistically significant levels. At
the frontier, such inputs as the teacher's verbal facility and the propor-
181 Henry M. LevinI.Kindergarten .888
Teacher's verbal ability 3.164
Teacher's parents' income .001
Teacher's undergraduate institution 1.273
Teacher experience .783
Teacher satisfaction 1.841
% white students 3.787
Library volumes per student .276
Teacher turnover .347
Constant .513
tion of white students show marginal products that are more than three
times their counterparts derived for the sample as a whole. On the other
hand, such variables as teacher turnover, teacher experience, and li-
brary volumes per student show much smaller coefficients for the frontier
function.
If these estimates are truly unbiased, the implications are that so-
called frontier schools are more efficient in the use of some inputs and
less efficient in the use of others. Thus any optimal combination of
inputs for any set of schools or any individual school is likely to be
nonoptimal for any other set of schools or individual ones. In other
words, for any given array of prices (P1, P2 the optimal set of
factor or input proportions may vary significantly from school to school.
For purposes of generalization, this is the worst of all possible worlds.
That is, while we might be able to derive the optimal input structure for
frontier schools or for schools on the average as represented by equilib-
rium conditions stated in (4), it is likely that the desirable combination of
input intensities will differ between the two sets of schools (and in all
probability will differ significantly frOm school to school).
An illustration of this is found in Table A-4, which shows the esti-
mated ratios of prices of two inputs as well as the two sets of marginal
products for those inputs. The prices reflect the increments to annual
teacher salaries for each of the characteristics as derived from an equa-
tion relating teacher attributes to earnings in the Eastmet teacher mar-
ket.34 The marginal products associated with a unit change in teacher
verbal score and teacher experience are taken from Table A-2.In
equilibrium the ratios of the marginal products of the inputs should be
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equal to the ratios of their respective prices. For the average production
estimates these ratios are almost identical, so that allocative or price
efficiency is implied even though the average estimates are assumed to
be based upon technically inefficient (nonfrontier) schools.
On the other hand, the frontier estimates show a ratio of marginal
products four times as great as the price ratio for the two inputs. This
suggests that the utilization of more verbally able teachers yields four
times as much output per dollar as the utilization of additional teacher
experience. If this is correct, the schools on the frontier could increase
total output by reallocating their budgets in favor of teacher verbal score
while reducing teacher experience.35
The significant aspect of this analysis is that the output maximizing
combination of inputs differs between the two estimates. If these differ-
ences persist among schools of different efficiencies, the hope of obtain-
ing general rules for decision making which can be applied across
schools seems to be frustrated. That is, the lack of similarities among the
production techniques used by different schools may mean that neither
average nor frontier findings can be applied to any particular school.
Indeed, in the extreme case each individual school is on its own produc-
tion function, and evaluation results for any group of schools will not be
applicable to individual schools in the sample.
NOTES
1.Both Smith and Friedman are concerned about inefficiencies that result when state-
run schools have little or no incentive to fulfill their stated objectives. (Smith 1937, p.
737; Friedman 1955 and 1962).
2.The rudiments of this specification were first suggested by Hanushek 1968.
3.For a more literal interpretation see Dugan (1969). Dugan has calculated the mone-
tary value of parents educational investment in their offspring by calculating the
opportunity cost or market value of such services. The values of educational
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-ninvestment, mother's educational investment, and school investment (all measured in
dollars) seem to have high combined predictive value in explaining achievement levels, earlier work
Also see Leibowitz, 1974.
yin(1968a
4.These "theories" are essentially "black-box" hypotheses, based upon correlational 18.Exceptions to
findings or upon man-machine analogies. They do not specify general input-output (1970), as we
structures or the physical, psychological, biological, and physiological processes Un- 19.Of course,m
denying them. Indeed, there is no engineering knowledge of the educational process that the corn]
that is remotely analogous to those in agriculture and manufacturing. See for exam- variety of ex;
pie, Bloom (1964). efficiency" of
5.The reasons for this assertion are found in Levin (1970a, pp. 65—66). it would appe
6.For general reviews of findings see Bowles (1970); Guthrie et a!. (1971, Chapter 3); would promo
Kiesling (1971); and Averch et al(1974). (1968); Tirnm
7.This assumption has been questioned by Michelson (1970, pp. 134—149); Bowles 20.In theory, sc
(1970, pp. 16—17); and Levin (1970a, pp. 57—59). Outputs. That
8.Certainly this can be related to the criticisms of the schools made by many commen- of
tators who see the schools focusing on the wrong outputs. For a more sophisticated, minimal level
but related, social welfare argument see Gintis (1969 and 1971) and Levin (1974a). schools produ
9.School districts in the United States vary in enrollments from a handful of students to frontier are oi
the over 1 million enrollees in New York City. Individual schools show enrollments outputs. That
varying from a few children into the 10,000 student range. There were some 19,000 schools that
operating school systems and 44.5 million public-school students in 1969. Of these 21.Inefficiency is
systems, only 1 per cent of them had 25,000 or more pupils. Yet, almost one-third of which more 0
the students were in the 25,000 and over category while less than 2 per cent were in from other ou
school systems with less than 300 pupils (Sietsema and Mongello, 1970, p. 6). or "x-inefficiei
10.For an analysis of the production decisions faced by the multi-product firm generally inefficiency,I
and the joint product firm specifically, see Sune Carlson (1956, Chapter V); and inputs. But, a
Pfouts (1961). of production
11.The conventional "theory of the firm" has come increasingly under attack by those and energy, si
who charge that it is a theory of an environment rather than a theory of behavior. See production fro
Cyert and Hedrick (1972) for a review of this controversy, process. Whe
12.In California, the state department of education even prints many of the books another mill, i
required at the elementary level. The cumbersomeness of this arrangement has just happens
resulted in a perennial ritual by which several hundred thousand youngsters have analyst is stee
lacked their reading and arithmetic books for periods of up to two or three months inefficiency ca
following the opening of school. For greater detail on the degree of external control is a function c
see Levin (1974a). the concept of
13.While Tiebout has suggested that such a public market exists, its efficiency must be (1966). In our
questioned. Costs of migration are high, preventing frequent movement in response outlined more
to disequilibria. Moreover, zoning and other impediments limit the usefulness of the 22.There is an o
housing market as a vehicle for educational choice. (See Tiebout 1956.) Of course, technological
private alternatives exist for those willing and able to make substantial financial 23.For discussion
sacrifices. (1968).
14.For some approaches to implementing competition among the public schools see 24.For evidence
Downs (1970). Data on the voucher-inspired federal experiment in San Jose, Califor- types of schoo
nia, are found in Weiler et ai. (1974). 25.These results
15.For an extensive taxononiy of educational objectivessee Bloom (1956); and 26.See Hall and'
Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia (1964). differences in
16.For a more general analysis of the relation between institutional performance and 27.See the comm
incentive structures see Schultze (1968) and Riviin (1971). Educational applications 28.See for exampi
are found in Pincus (1974). C''I Ri ht1
17.Muiticoilinearity among such inputs is a major basis of criticism for some of the
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ksm forsome of the
earlier work done in the area of estimating educational production. See Bowles and
Levin (1968a and 1968b).
18.Exceptions to this are the multi-product estimations of Levin (1970a) and Michelson
(1970), as well as the work of Boardman et al. (1973).
19.Of course, many private firms are likely to be technically inefficient to the degree
that the competitive assumptions do not hold for them. See Leibenstein (1966) for a
variety of examples illustrating substantial differences in technical efficiency or
efficiency" of firms. Nevertheless, while the inefficiency club is not an exclusive one,
it would appear a priori that public schools have even fewer of the characteristics that
would promote efficient production than do private firms. See Aigner and Chu
(1968); Timmer (1971); and Farrell (1957).
20.In theory, schools on the frontier for student achievement are producing no other
outputs. That is, the production of other outputs is assumed to detract from the
production of student achievement. But, in fact,itis likely that there is a socially
minimal level of other outputs (such as citizenship, work attitudes, and so on) that all
schools produce. In this case, the schools that appear to be on the achievement
frontier are on a 'modified frontier," which assumes a socially minimal level of other
outputs. That is, short of an experiment, we are unable to obtain production data on
schools that are producing only student achievement.
21.Inefficiency is used here in a very narrow way. Specifically, it refers to the case in
which more of a particular output could be obtained by reallocating existing resources
from other outcomes to the one under scrutiny. The case of "technical inefficiency"
or 'x-inefficiency" is just a misnomer for this condition. Under conditions of technical
inefficiency, it appears that more output could be obtained with the same level of
inputs. But, as we have shown elsewhere (Levin and Muller, 1973), the physical laws
of production must surely behave according to the principles of conservation of mass
and energy, so that nothing is "lost" in the production process. One is always on the
production frontier in that there is a mapping of outputs on inputs for any production
process. When a steel mill is producing less steel for a given set of inputs than
another mill, it is producing more heat energy or worker leisure or other outputs. It
just happens that the most-valued or preferred output from the perspective of the
analyst is steel rather than heat energy or worker leisure. Thus, so-called technical
inefficiency can always be shown to reduce to allocative or price inefficiency, since it
is a function of values rather than energy losses in a physical sense. For reference to
the concept of technical efficiency or x-efficieney, see Farrell (1957) and Leibenstein
(1966). In our view, the conception is erroneous for reasons mentioned above and
outlined more systematically in Levin and Muller (1973). Also see Knight (1923).
22.There is an obvious similarity between this issue and the question of neutrality of
technological progress. See Salter (1960); Brown (1966).
23.For discussion of techniques for deriving such a convex hull, see Aigner and Chu
(1968).
24.For evidence of price differences attributable to teacher preferences for particular
types of schools and teaching environments, see Toder (1972) and Levin (1968).
25.These results are also reported in Levin (1974).
26.See Hall and Winsten (1959) for a discussion of complications arising from interfirm
differences in environmental conditions.
27.See the comments by Walters (1963, pp. 5—11).
28.See for example James S. Coleman et al. (1966, Chapter 1); and U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (1967). For criticism of such policy uses see Bowles and Levin (1968a),
and Cain and Watts (1970).
185 Henry M. Levin29.There is an obvious parallel with the behavioral theory of the firm. See Cyert and Bowles, Samuel,aj
March (1963) and Cyert and Hedrick (1972). (Nov/Dec
30.See Levm (1970a) for details. Bowles, Samuel,au
31.Ibid. Books, Inc.,
32.Unfortunately each observation is a student rather than a firm. The proper approach Bowles, Samuel, au
is to seek efficient firms (schools) rather than students. The reason that students are Critical Ap1
used rather than firms is due to the limited sample size of schools, 29. Since it would (Winter 196
require 18 of these firms to fit the frontier—given 18 parameters—one could hardly ."Moreon
maintain that the frontier coefficients were based only on efficient firms. Resources 3
33.Sincea1 ￿0,those variables that showed coefficients for the average Bowles, Samuel, ai
function represented problems for the programming estimates. The array for each Reproductio
such variable was multiplied by (—1) for the programming estimates, and the signs 1974): 39—5'
were reversed in turn when reporting the results in Table A-2. The author is Brown, Byron, am
indebted to Richard C. Carison for computing the programming estimates. See his Within Sch
paper "Educational Efficiency and Effectiveness," May 1970, prepared for the Brown, Murray. 0
Seminar in Economics of Education, Stanford. Cambridge
34.These are taken from Levin (1968). For a similar application of these prices see Levin Burkhead et al.I
(1970c). University 1
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lew York: Random It alwayshelps to take stock periodically of what we are doing and where we
are going. Educational research is certainly no exception. Itis simply too
Abilityand Screen- easyto continue doing what we know best. However, after being forced by
Levin into a reappraisal of the directions of educational research,Iremain
ISons, 1971. unpersuaded that drastic modification is called for. Ihave some serious
fPoliticalEconomy reservationsabout the conclusions and implications both for research and
sDepartmentof publicpolicy drawn from Levin's analysis, particularly asitpertains to
technical inefficiency in the schools.
Technical Ef- In many ways, Levin's viewpoint does not diverge significantly from my
own. We start from the same data; there is no disagreement about the
A PossibleSource constraintson the system or about the amount of knowledge and information
54(Nov.1972): available to the participants in the educational process. We also agree on
many of the results that develop from constraints on information and possi-
ducation.Financial bleactions. Our major points of disagreement arise from nomenclature of
itionalRecords and observedoutput differences and the subsequent implications for future re-
GPO,1957. ,
, search and public policy.
ducatwnalStatistics . .
Inhis taxonomy of types of inefficiency, Levin argues that there are fEducation. Wash- .
reasons to believe that schools are not operating on the production frontier
Econometrica (technicalinefficiency), are not operating with the best input mix (allocative
I inefficiency), and are not providing the desired output mix (social welfare
Lipe.Dewey; and inefficiency).The heart of his analysis is directed toward the evidence
ofEvaluation Data concerningtechnical inefficiency and its implications for research and pub-
lic policy. That is also the central issue in my discussion.
191 Comments by HanushekBefore entering that debate, however, I wish to make two points relating to
allocative and social welfare efficiency. These are not points of disagree- They are j:
ment with Levin; they are simply added to emphasize certain aspects of the terms, defininc
discussion. First, allocate inefficiency has not only been the central concern analysis of ted
of economists but is also almost a necessary condition for analysis. In the the base moth
absence of large differences in the relative prices of inputs, allocative inefficiency the
inefficiency is needed to analyze educational production functions. 0th- chosen
erwise we would observe one point on the production function, and our the frame of
statistical techniques are noticeably weak at drawing multidimensional veloped from a
planes through one point. Second, the whole issue of social welfare ef- amount of me
ficiency, or producing the best mixture of outputs, has the same elusive becoming avai
character as choosing the right quantity and mixture of general public goods. A different
The optimum marginal conditions on the social welfare function are easy well-specified
enough to derive, but the operational questions have generally been beyond differences in
the economist's ability to answer. Nevertheless, in my subjective evaluation, function that p
this is probably the most important area of concern in education today. The man-hours with
question of whether or not schools are producing the outputs desired and view of the lab
needed in society remains important but unresolved. We are not sure what are represente
the outputs of schools are, how to measure the outputs, how to produce correlated with
each, or what tradeoffs exist among outputs. Not only space limitations on stein's internati
this discussion but also the difficulty of the issue preclude my going into a distorted vie
more detail on this. why the analys
The main message delivered by Levin is that there are compelling reasons go into produc
to believe that what have paraded under the banner of educational produc- seen in a micr
tion functions are not really production functions in the economist's usage of
In point of fa
the term, because they do not describe the frontier of possible production.
day in educati
Instead they are a weighted average of the practices of efficient, or 'fron-
decade have n
tier," schools and inefficient, or "nonfrontier," schools. With these average
neous teachers
relationships, blind application of well-known optimization rules could even
purchased




A crucial facet of the debate is how one should define technical inef-
other attributes
ficiency.Past discussions,for example,Leibenstein's development of
However, to th
X-efficiency[2]and Levin'spresentation,rest heavily uponamicro- proportion of th
economic textbook treatment of production, where output is a function of a
importance of
quantity of homogeneous capital and homogeneous labor. Then, noting that
minished.
these inputs are really not homogeneous, firms with poorer "homogeneous" If we map a
inputs are observed to produce less output than firms with identical quan- chased by sch
tities but better quality "homogeneous" inputs. The availability of better or education), we
worse "homogeneous" inputs can be related to incomplete labor contracts, This will happeil
lack of knowledge of the production function, motivational differences, or tors have a smi
simply general managerial ability. Differences in output forequal" inputs characteristics
are used as a measure of technical inefficiency, factors are not1
A real problem remains in specifically defining technical inefficiency. In schools with
ameasure of the strength of Yet, within the
variables omitted from a model of the production process. These omitted is: Do schools
variables may take the form of education, motivation, laziness, or what have
held
It is
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you. They are just the explanations given for efficiency differences. In these
terms, defining technical inefficiency becomes very difficult. Before any
analysis of technical inefficiency can be developed, one must define what
the base model of the production process should look like. Amounts of
inefficiency then become difficult to measure, since they are a function of the
chosen degree of misspecification in the base model. A common way to set
the frame of reference appears to be using the model which can be de-
veloped from available data. This, of course, creates problems, because the
amount of inefficiency can change over time simply due to better data
becoming available.
A different way of looking at this 'inefficiency," however,is to use a
well-specified model as the standard and to view observed production
differences in terms of model misspecification. The traditional production
function that pictures output as a function of the quantity of man-hours or
man-hours within given human capital classifications provides an incomplete
view of the labor input to production. There are more attributes to labor than
are represented in these functions. These omitted attributes often tend to be
correlated with management ability or firm size or nationality in Leiben-
stein's international examples. Estimated production functions can then give
a distorted view of the production potential. There is, however, no reason
why the analyst cannot specify or attempt to specify all of the attributes that
go into production. He need not be bound to specifying just those inputs as
seen in a microeconomic text or those explicitly purchased by the firm.
In point of fact, this extension of the list of inputs has been the order of the
day in educational research. Educational production functions of the past
decade have not looked at schools as providing a given number of homoge-
neous teachers; nor have they looked at schools as providing only the set of
purchased inputs (class size, experience, and graduate education). Instead
they have looked at schools as providing a set of attributes, such as teacher
verbal ability. The attributes explicitly measured may well be proxies for
other attributes which have direct causal relationships with achievement.
However, to the extent that a set of stable proxies which represent a fair
proportion of the real teacher inputs to education have been analyzed, the
importance of the technicalinefficiency argumentisconsiderably di-
minished.
If we map achievement outputs against only those inputs explicitly pur-
chased by schools (class size, teacher experience, and teacher graduate
education), we will certainly find the picture indicated by Levin's Figure 1.
This will happen because, according to past analyses, the purchased fac-
tors have a small or nonexistent effect on output, but other nonpurchased
characteristics of teachers do have an important effect. Since these other
factors are not randomly distributed by schools—as shown in Levin[31,
schools with apparently the same input levels will show different outputs.
Yet, within the context of educational production functions, the real question
is: Do schools have different outputs after the relevant teacher inputs are
held constant?
Itis reasonable that past discussions in fields other than education have
193 Comments by Hanushekcentered upon technical inefficiency in production. This arises largely from
having poorer data sources for, say, aggregate manufacturing firms than for
educational firms. Research in education has been aided by having detailed
measures of relevant inputs. Further, the emphasis within educational re-
search has been on refining the measures of inputs. This is not to say that we
now have perfectly specified models of educational production. We have a
long way to go in that regard. It does imply that attention has been placed
where I think it properly should be—on model specification and, to a certain
extent, on experimental design.
The case by Levin for technical inefficiency derives chiefly from the
observations that school managers do not know what the production function
for education looks like and that these managers are severely constrained in
their operating and hiring practices. Other factors relating to technical in-
efficiencies are the general lack of competition in education and lack of both
incentives and clear-cut signals of success or failure.
From a specification point of view, the implications to be drawn from
Levin's observations of current school operations change considerably. First,
I am uncertain how the school principal, whether he knows the production
function or not, affects technical efficiency.If, as past research would sug-
gest, the main school inputs to education under the current technology are
attributes of the teacher,itis hard to see how the principal affects the
relationship between these attributes and achievement by very much. in
terms of managing teachers, the principal may assign his best reading
teacher to teach physical education; this is an allocatively poor decision that
would reduce total achievement in a school for his expenditures, but not
necessarily one that falls off the production frontier for education. It indicates
that the analyst must be careful to separate the characteristics of the
physical education teacher and the reading teacher, But, given this, there
seems to be no reason to require the principal to know that he is making a
mistake.
The fact that there are constraints on the manager's actions does not seem
to destroy the usefulness of estimated production functions either. Con-
straints imply that he can only operate on a limited portion of possible input
mixes. For example, a principal probably does not have the option to install
a Computer-Assisted Instruction (CAl) program on his own. Nevertheless, he
can attempt to suboptimize within the portion of the production frontier
available to him. There is no reason to suspect that any such suboptimiza-
tion attempts lead to. technical inefficiency.
The other conceptual reasons for concluding that technical inefficiency is
probably large produce a similar discussion. Such reasons seem to imply
that schools could be allocatively very inefficient but not technically in-
efficient.
There is an empirical question about the importance of variables relating
to facilities, curriculum, and management which may be systematically re-
lated to achievement and not generally included in production models.I
have made a modest attempt to answer this question with a sample of 515
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a sample of 515
The data sam-
pie and estimated educational models are reported elsewhere [11. After
standardizing for different teacher inputs, Iattempted to find out whether
there were characteristics of schools and principals which systematically
affected output. For this analysis, each of twenty-three schools in the sample
was allowed to have its own intercept value, and statistical tests were
performed to ascertain whether these intercepts differed by school. The
intercept dummy variables provide estimates of the systematic school ef-
fects, regardless of whether the components of these effects can be ade-
quately specified or measured. These effects would be equivalent to a
measure of technical efficiency.
Within this sample, only one school out of twenty-three (comprising two
per cent of the students) produced significantly higher outputs after standar-
dizing for teacher inputs.' This appears to be very weak evidence for the
existence of important technical inefficiencies. Matched against this is the
finding that the total wage bill could be reduced by approximately 22 per
cent with no decrease in achievement by not hiring individuals possessing
superior experience or graduate education, or by not paying for such
experience and graduate education, which were shown to have no impact on
achievement. (In other words, by improving allocative efficiency, a savings
of 22 per cent could be realized.)
Finally, we know that there is a large random component associated
with individual achievement. There is no reason to suspect that we get more
or better information about educational production by looking at a smaller
sample, whether by linear programming or least squares. Also, even in the
context of viewing "efficient" production with linear programming, there is no
reason to believe that specification problems are any less severe, If we wish
to make decisions about educational production from considering "efficient"
schools, we are still left with trying to decide why such schools are efficient.
In other words, we are left with the same specification problems.
CONCLUSIONS
Itis not evident to me that technical inefficiency is a particularly large
problem, unless we use obviously misspecified models as the standard.
Within the context of well-specified models, similar to those developed
within the past few years, emphasis upon allocative efficiency appears war-
ranted. Ido not wish to indicate that we know all there is to know about
educational production. Yet, both conceptually and empirically, allocative
inefficiency seems more important than technical inefficiency.
The difference in my approach and Levin's is more than a question of
semantics. First, use of the term inefficiency tends to imply that there is a
free lunch, that some organizational changes within the school will bring
about significant changes in outputs at little or no cost. On the other hand,
when viewed in terms of omitted variables,itis immediately obvious that
bringing "inefficient" schools up to the level of "efficient" schools may not
195
IComments by Hanushekbe free. Second, the term technical inefficiency seems to imply that the
observed differences in outputs are related almost exclusively to manage-
ment differences. However, my work has led me to suspect that the real
efforts should be directed toward better specifying teachers and their inputs
to education. Third, the concept of technical efficiency appears vacuous
from a public policy viewpoint. Even if some consensus could be arrived at
as to how this inefficiency should be measured, we are at best led to trying
to explain these differences in order to reduce the differentials involved.
If the problem is looked upon as one of specification problems, it leads to
intensifying data collection efforts and broadening the scope of our mea-
surement of teacher attributes,It also calls for experimentation in order to
observe other parts of the production frontier. If instead, one concludes that
school management in terms of approaching the production frontier is the
key issue, a different course of action is called for, In this case, much more
effort should be directed toward analyzing organizational behavior and the
relationship between management, teachers, and facilities. In my judgment,
the former course of action will have much higher payoffs.
On the other hand, Levin's observations about the definition and measure-
ment of educational outputs cannot be disregarded. Even though cognitive
ability, as measured by test scores, is undoubtedly an important aspect of
elementary and secondary schools, this is not the sole output of schools.
While the joint product problem is not completely developed by Levin,it
represents a very important issue for future research. Unfortunately, the
methodology for handling joint production when there are no prices (or
weights) to combine the different dimensions of output is an underdeveloped
area of economics.
NOTE
1.Another significant aspect of this estimation was the finding that the dummy variable for this
school had a very low correlation with each of the included school variables. (The simple
correlation was always less than .1.) This implies that even if we were to believe that the
dummy variable represented some omitted management aspects for this school, its effect on
the included coefficient estimates is small: that is, the amount of specification bias would be
small.
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196 Economic Efficiency and Educational Production 197 ICommtThe primary conclusion Levin arrives at in this paper is that valid prescrip-
tions for improving efficiency of the educational process (or that partS of it
which takes place in public schools) cannot be derived from existing esti-
mated production functions. He argues that the world is much more compli-
cated than the available econometric models of educational production and
that naive attempts to draw normative conclusions from such models could
be counter-productive. These conclusions seem appropriate enough as
warnings or expressions of humility, but they also seem quite anticlimactic
at the end of so many pages of analytic threshing about.
Levin opens by attempting to motivate our interest in efficiency by observ-
ing the rising costs of education combined with dissatisfaction over the
quality of schools and loss of voter support for bond issues. It is quite clear
that improvements in efficiency, if any are available, would offset for a while
some of the increase in costs and might produce a more popular product.
But the existence of inefficiency, in any of its varieties, does not imply either
rising costs or consumer dissatisfaction. If inefficiency were getting worse at
some steady rate, we might expect the consequences of rising costs and/or
falling quality, but Levin does not provide evidence of progressive inef-
ficiency. In no sense does the hypothesis of inefficiency provide an alterna-
tive to the 'pessimistic" view of Baumol that 'unprogressive" sectors will
suffer cost increases as other sectors enjoy productivity gains and con-
sequent wage increases.
But there is probably plenty of interest in efficiency as a property of the
educational system and further motivation is unnecessary. Levin proceeds to
use production isoquartts and output transformation loci to illustrate various
kinds of inefficiency and also to introduce various ways that model misspec-
ification can foul up econometric estimates of production functions. Here
one principal point is that productive units that are not using efficient
techniques will not lie on the production frontier and will result in the
estimation of a subfrontier production function. A second one is that output
measurements may be incorrectly specified (either in one or many dimen-
sions) and that spurious inefficiencies or 'second bests" may be perceived
as a consequence of that misspecification.
The next section of Levin's paper presents a long a priori argument in
support of the proposition that schools must be inefficientl The main premise
seems to be that they are unlike private competitive firms in a number of
critical respects, and without those characteristics educational "firms" have
no basis for achieving efficiency. Ifind myself quite convinced that the
education "industry" is poles apart from the straw-man industry which has all
the perfect properties of the competitive model. However, it seems that most
of the real world of productive enterprises share enough of those imperfec-
tions to invalidate for them the simpleminded empirical analysis that Levin
criticizes for education. Again, Ican easily accept the argument that our
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-Jcannot agree that the contrast other private or public production is
particularly unfavorable.
The other part of the section spells out the limitations of standardized
achievement tests as measures of school output. Ifully share all Levin's
reservations here and would welcome any progress toward satisfactory
measures of neglected aspects, but again, this is a problem of measuring
the outputs of a human-service industry and that is an unsolved problem
everywhere.
The next section explores the GIGO1 production function as applied to
econometric research and derived policy prescriptions in education. Levin
is quite persuasive about the various kinds of mischief that can result from a
zealous application of intermediate theory to the estimated production func-
tions for education which have appeared in respectable journals. He is
motivated in this analysis by a belief that there is a real danger of these
half-baked conclusions being promulgated by ukasé, and even worse, that
they will affect school practice.
My own appreciation of how hard it is to get any real change in the way
schools and teachers behave, combined with Levin's own sense about how
varied schools are, both on and off the efficiency frontier, make the threat of
lockstep imitation of the latest econometric optimality formula pretty remote.
Consequently,I can accept his analysis of what-if-everyone-acted-silly with-
out agreeing on the likelihood of the premise.
In the end, Levin pleads for better models—always a popular plea—and
suggests that a "behavioral theory of schools" may be under construction by
Bowles and Gintis. Clearly one can begin to be relevant once a reasonably
comprehensive concept of the objectives or outputs of schools has been
specified; and maximum standardized achievement test scores do not fill
the bill. Better models also include more attention to how observations are
generated and to the implications for econometric estimation. The use of
programming techniques to form "envelope" estimates is one possible im-
provement and Levin's numerical example shows that it may be of some
importance. Clearly our economic and econometric analyses of the educa-
tion industry in general and its production function in particular are very
crude and are not strong enough to support policy recommendations. I am
more optimistic than Levin that the work to date has been harmless and may
even have been helpful in moving toward more useful models.I am quite
pessimistic about the chance of an estimated second derivative ever becom-
ing the basis of a universally followed command which will halt or reverse
the upward trend of educational costs.
NOTE
1.Garbage In Garbage Out.
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